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Abstract
This paper highlights the arbitrage activity by firms in Miller’s (1977) equilibrium when consumers face
(short) selling constraints to restrict tax arbitrage.  In this competitive equilibrium firms create risky tax-
preferred securities that divide investors into strict tax clienteles; any changes in debt-equity ratios by
individual firms have no real effects on consumers because other firms undo them.  While DeAngelo and
Masulis obtain this equilibrium with a full set of primitive bonds and a full set of primitive shares, the
formalisation here relies only on a full set of conventional securities for firms to buy and sell.  Once firms are
constrained (for example, when the capital market is incomplete), Kim et al. (1979), Taggart (1980), Kim
(1982) and Auerbach and King (1983) identify investor leverage clienteles.  This paper demonstrates the
arbitrage activity by firms that is implicit in Sarig and Scott (1982) who argue these clienteles are eliminated
by standard portfolio theory.
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* I am indebted to Frank Milne for many helpful discussions on this topic.  Warner (1977) presents estimates of these costs for US railway firms.  DeAngelo and Masulis
1
(1980a) provide a nice formal presentation of the optimal capital structures which arise from bankruptcy costs
and lost corporate tax shields in a state preference model.   Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue that bankruptcy
costs can be avoided when financial intermediaries repackage the capital structures of firms.
  Miller’s analysis is undertaken in a classical finance model with common information between
2
agents in a competitive capital market.  Common information rules out the agency costs that arise when
investors and firm managers have different information, and competition invokes price-taking behaviour on all
agents.  No dividends are paid in Miller’s equilibrium.
  Unless tax arbitrage is constrained, investors have infinite demands for their tax preferred securities
3
when tax rates are independent of income, or their tax preferences are eliminated when marginal tax rates are
continuous increasing functions of income.
  Note also, that with marginal investors, the aggregate debt-equity ratio is indeterminate within
4
upper and lower bounds determined by the demands of debt and equity specialists, where the range of
indeterminancy depends on the amount of wealth marginal investors allocate to corporate securities.
  Individual firms cannot change the risk spreading opportunities available to investors in a
5
competitive capital market because there are perfect substitutes for every security they supply.  To maximize




Modigliani and Miller (1963) showed how firms facing a classical corporate tax can raise their
market values with higher leverage, where this can lead ultimately to an all debt equilibrium. 
There are a number of explanations for the interior debt-equity ratios that we observe.  For
example, expected bankruptcy costs and lost corporate tax shields increase with leverage, but
they do not appear to be large enough in isolation to offset the tax advantage of debt.   Miller
1
(1977) identifies personal taxes for high tax investors that can favour equity by an amount
sufficient to offset the corporate tax bias against it.  This occurs when capital gains on shares
are taxed less than cash distributions as dividends and interest.   By itself, the corporate tax
2
drives firms into debt, but progressive personal taxes can leave high tax investors with a
preference for equity and low tax investors with a preference for debt.  This leads to an
interior aggregate debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole with debt specialists,
equity specialists and marginal investors.  Miller preserves these tax clienteles in equilibrium
by imposing selling constraints on investors to restrict tax arbitrage, and then demonstrates
that leverage is irrelevant to the market value of individual firms.
3,4
A general equilibrium model is used in this paper to provide a simple geometric analysis of
Miller’s equilibrium in an uncertainty setting.  This isolates the important arbitrage activity by
corporations when investors face selling constraints.  In their original derivations of the
irrelevance propositions without taxes, Modigliani and Miller (1958) focus on the arbitrage
activity by investors who re-bundle their portfolios to undo any changes in the financial
policies of firms.  In Miller’s equilibrium, however, ‘homemade leverage’ is restricted, so firms
must perform this activity in a competitive capital market.   When reflecting on the 30
5t h
anniversary of the Modigliani-Miller (MM) propositions, Miller (1988) acknowledges how
important this is by noting that “much of what passes these days for corporate-raiding-cum-
restructuring is just MM leverage arbitrage, but channeled through the raider’s corporate,  Conventional securities have payouts in more than one state.  A full set of conventional securities
6
requires as many linearly independent securities as the states of nature.
  Senbet and Taggart (1984) extend this result in the presence of taxation to other forms of capital
7
market imperfections and incompleteness.  They argue that when firms have a comparative advantage in
dealing with these imperfections they have an incentive to act as financial intermediaries and to complete the
market for consumers in a competitive equilibrium.
2
rather than personal, investment account.”  In fact, this arbitrage occurs in a less obvious way
when firms (or, as Ross (1988) observes, financial intermediaries who write derivatives on
corporate assets) buy and sell each others securities.
The simplest place to begin a formalisation of Miller’s equilibrium is with certainty where
investors choose between debt and equity solely on the basis of their tax preferences.  In this
setting, changes in firm debt-equity ratios do not impact on real household consumption when
they can be absorbed by marginal investors.  This, however, conceals the arbitrage that occurs
in a more general setting.  To see why, consider what happens without marginal investors;
when one firm increases its debt-equity ratio there is an excess supply of debt and an excess
demand for equity that puts downward pressure on bond prices and upward pressure on share
prices.  Other firms respond to these price changes by shifting from debt into equity, and this
preserves the initial aggregate debt-equity ratio that supplies consumers with their tax-
preferred securities.
Uncertainty makes the analysis more complicated because investors have tax and risk
preferences for securities.  DeAngelo and Masulis (1980b) obtain Miller’s equilibrium with a
complete set of primitive, or Arrow, securities for both debt and equity (i.e., a full set of
primitive bonds and a full set of primitive shares.)  This allows investors to satisfy their risk
preferences by holding just tax-preferred securities, but it raises the question as to whether or
not we can replicate Miller’s equilibrium with conventional securities.   When investors face
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(short) selling constraints they cannot create their tax-preferred risky securities, even with a
complete set of conventional securities.  Instead, they may hold debt and equity to spread risk,
where this increases the tax paid from corporate income.
Kim et al. (1979), Taggart (1980), Kim (1982) and Auerbach and King (1983) identify
investor leverage clienteles when this happens; firms use leverage decisions to change the
riskiness of their securities, and investors gravitate toward firms that supply the securities they
most prefer.  Harris, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1983) and Kim (1982) find empirical evidence to
support the existence of these leverage clienteles, but Sarig and Scott (1985) use standard
portfolio theory to argue investor leverage clienteles do not arise in a competitive equilibrium
similar to the one described by Miller.  In this paper we formalise their argument by making
explicit the arbitrage activity by firms who face incentives in a competitive capital market to
provide investors with securities that fully satisfy their risk and tax preferences.  Once again,
this gives rise to strict tax clienteles, but without the capital market being “double complete”.
In a frictionless market with common information, which is the setting for Miller’s equilibrium,
firms know what types of securities investors desire, and it is costless for them to create these
securities.   If, for whatever reason, the capital market is incomplete (which is assumed
7s￿1,......,S
  Bhattacharya (1988) and Stiglitz (1988) identify asymmetric information between corporate insiders
8
and outsiders as an important reason for the failure of the M-M propositions.
  Corporate tax shields are preserved in our model by assuming the tax code treats profits and losses
9
symmetrically.  DeAngelo and Masulis (1980a) examine the optimal capital structures that arise when profits
and losses are treated asymmetrically.
3
explicitly in Kim, Kim et al., and Taggart, and implicitly in Auerbach and King), strict tax
clienteles are replaced by financial leverage clienteles where firms offer a restricted set of
securities to attract investors with similar risk and tax preferences.   Clearly, this possibility
8
arises with costly information, but not in the confines of the classical model adopted by Miller.
Aivazian and Callen (1987) use Edgeworth box diagrams to illustrate the equilibrium obtained
by DeAngelo and Masulis.  They focus on the demand side of the model and illustrate the
equilibrium relationships between security returns when tax rates are continuous functions of
income and compare this to the returns when tax rates are endowed on investors facing selling
constraints.  The geometric analysis in this paper differs by examining the security trades by
firms and consumers to highlight the arbitrage activity that lies behind Miller’s equilibrium.
We begin the analysis in section 2 by formalising a two-period state-preference model where a
competitive equilibrium is characterised in the absence of taxes.  This equilibrium is presented
using diagrams in section 3 of the paper.  Taxes, both corporate and personal, are included in
section 4 to obtain Miller’s equilibrium.  The paper concludes in section 5 with a brief
summary of the main findings.
2.  Equilibrium in a Competitive Corporate Capital Market
All activity takes place at two points in time, t=0 and t=1, and there is a single non-storable
good, x, which consumers are endowed with in the first period; they consume some of it then,
and use the rest to buy financial securities from corporate firms who invest it to produce
output of good x in the second period.  The proceeds from this output are used to buy back
financial securities from consumers.  In other words, consumers transfer some of their current
endowment of good x into the future period with corporate securities.
There is technological uncertainty in the model where firm output is uncertain and depends on
the state of nature, s, which is outside the control of all agents.  We assume a finite possible
number of states of nature   which are mutually exclusive.  All agents agree on the
state space and assign subjective probabilities to each state; they have common information.
Consumers and firms are small in the capital market, which is assumed to be competitive, and
there are no leverage related costs.   The only securities that trade are corporate securities,
9
and there are K of them.  The demand, supply and equilibrium conditions will now be
formalised, initially in the absence of taxes.
Demand:  There are a large number of consumers, i=1,......I, who maximise utility by
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  The first order conditions are obtained by substituting the constraints in (1b) directly into the utility
10
function where the consumer problem in (1) becomes:
4
Notation:
 - i's endowment of the consumption good at t=0;
 - i's consumption at t=0;
 - market price of good x at t=0;
 - units of security k purchased by i at t=0;
 - market price of security k at t=0 in state s;
 - i's consumption at t=1 in state s;
 - market price of good x at t=1 in state s;
 - payouts to security k in state s; and,
 - is the lower bound on the units of security k sold by individual i, with  ￿ 0.
The amount of good x each individual consumes and the amount they spend on corporate
securities in the first period, is constrained by their initial endowment in (1a).  Their
consumption of good x in each state s is constrained by the payouts to securities in (1b), while
the selling constraints in (1c) will apply later when taxes are introduced.
The first order condition for current consumption is:
(2)       ,





































iR ￿ ˜ pk
˜ q ￿ ˜ q
i ￿ ˜ pkR
￿1 ~i.
This formulation reflects the fact that security demands are derived from underlying consumer demands for
state-contingent consumption.
  Formally,  .
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where   is i’s personalised discount factor for state s dollars.   The inequalities will
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apply in (3) when selling by investors is constrained.    is the lagrange multiplier for the
budget constraint in (1a); it is i’s marginal utility for a dollar of income at t=0.  Thus,   is the
rate i is willing to substitute between dollars at t=0 and dollars in state s at t=1. 
To simplify the analysis, define R as the (SxK) matrix of state-contingent payouts on the K
traded securities;   as the (1xS) row vector of personalised discount factors; and   as the
(1xK) column vector of security prices.  Using this notation the first order conditions in (3)
are written more compactly as:
12
.
When R is full rank (with rank(R) = K = S) households can trade across all the states by
bundling securities of different risk together.  This requires:
(i)  As many linearly independent securities as states of nature; and,
(ii) Investors can buy or sell securities without constraint.
These conditions make the capital market complete for consumers, where the personalised
discount factors in (31) are equated across all i, with:
Supply:  There are a large number of price-taking firms, j=1,........,J, who sell securities at t=0
to buy inputs of the current consumption good from consumers.  These inputs are used at t=0
to produce state-contingent outputs at t=1 which are paid to consumers when firms redeem































































jR ￿ ˜ pk
˜ q ￿ ˜ q
j ￿ ˜ pk R
￿1 ~j
˜ q ￿ ˜ q
i ￿ ˜ q
j ￿ ˜ pkR ~i,j.
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Additional notation:
 - firm j's investment at t=0;
 - firm j's output at t=1 in state s;
 - units of security k supplied by firm j at t=0; and,
 - is the lower bound on the units of security k purchased by firm j, with  ￿ 0.
State contingent payouts to securities are bounded by firm j’s net outputs in (4a), while (4b)
captures any buying constraints on firm j when  .  The optimal investment decision
satisfies:
,
while the efficient supply of each security k satisfies:
,
where   is firm j's personalised discount factor for dollars in state s; it is the state-
contingent Lagrange multiplier for the problem in (4).  This provides the familiar asset
valuation equation where, in the absence of constraints, the price of each security k is equal to
the discounted present value of its state-contingent payouts.  Using vector notation for the
first order conditions in (6) we obtain:
.
The securities market is complete for firms when R has full rank and there are no constraints
on their security trades.  Accordingly, they can arbitrage away any difference in the returns to
debt and equity in each state, where this equates the discount factors on future dollars across
firms, with:
.
When the capital market is complete for both consumers and firms, we have, in the absence of
taxes:
































￿k ˜ Rk ~s ￿ S
˜ Rk
pk￿s
    There are also questions of uniqueness and stability of equilibrium.  The equilibrium is unique
13
when preference sets are strictly convex and firm production technologies are strictly concave.
7
Equilibrium:   A competitive equilibrium is characterised by a vector of security prices  ,
state-contingent prices  , and current price  , such that:
13
(i)    - solves the consumer problem for each i = 1, ........, I;
(ii)    - solves the firm problem for each j = 1, ........, J;
(iii)   ; and,
(iv)   .
The security trades in (i) and (ii) solve the respective optimisation problems for all consumers
and firms, while conditions (iii) and (iv) require market clearing in the respective financial and
commodity markets.
Before proceeding to the geometric analysis it is worth noting that in a competitive capital
market no individual firm or consumer can affect the payouts to securities i.e., they cannot
supply new securities because perfect substitutes exist or can be created by bundling together
existing securities.  Thus, all agents effectively have access to a full set of primitive securities,
with:
,
where R  is the primitive security that pays only in state s, and   the vector of payouts across s
all the states for each conventional security k.  By arbitrage, the price of each primitive
security,  , is the linear weighted sum of the prices of its derivative conventional securities
with weights equal to the amount of each security held in the derivative portfolio.
Thus, each firm implicitly supplies a bundle of primitive securities that are written over given
net cash flows, where the debt-equity choice simply relabels these primitive securities without
having any real effects on consumers.  In a (frictionless) competitive capital market, financial
assets are a veil over the real economy.
3.  M-M Leverage Irrelevance in the Absence of Taxes
To facilitate the diagrammatic analysis that follows we group corporate securities together as
debt (b) and equity (e) instruments i.e., debt is a bundle of risky bonds, and equity is a bundle
of risky shares.  The following table summarises the first order conditions (FOC’s) for the





























































































Figure 1:  The Representative Firm
Security Firm j
It is important to note that when firms change their debt-equity ratios they are repackaging a
given set of payouts across states (with investment held constant).  Thus, debt and equity are
equally risky at the margin.  Using the FOC's in the table above we obtain the familiar
condition for an optimum, with:
The possible equilibrium
outcomes are illustrated in
Figure 1.  The amount of debt
and equity firm j supplies is
constrained by its net outputs
and the payouts it makes on
these securities.  The line 
summarises this constraint, and
its slope ( ) is equal to the
relative payouts on debt and
equity; this is the marginal cost
of leverage to firm value.  The
iso-profit lines   have slopes
equal to the relative price of debt
and equity; they measure the
marginal benefit of leverage to
firm value.  At point A the firm
sells only equity when  is flatter than the asset production frontier  .   At point B the
firm sells only debt when   is steeper than  .  In a complete capital market arbitrage by
firms will equate the slope of the iso-profit line to the slope of the asset production frontier,
with:
.
The following table summarises the FOC’s for the optimal amount of debt and equity held by
the representative consumer i using (3). 



















































































  We analyse consumer preferences for changes in firm debt-equity ratios which shuffle the same
14
payouts between debt and equity at the margin.
9
Figure 2:  The Representative Consumer
Security Consumer i
When firms change their debt-equity ratio they are reshuffling the same set of state-contingent
payouts between the two types of securities.  From the FOC's above, consumer i's valuation
for this debt-equity change is:
This is illustrated in Figure 2,
where   is the budget
constraint that summarises the
possible combinations of debt
and equity consumer i can hold
with given initial net wealth
.  The
indifference schedules are linear
because debt and equity are
equally risky at the margin.  
14
When the MRS between debt
and equity along indifference
schedule   is less than the
slope of the budget constraint
the consumer prefers only
equity, while for the MRS along
indifference schedule   the
consumer prefers only debt. 
In a complete capital market arbitrage by consumers equates their marginal rates of
substitution to the relative price of debt and equity, where in Figure 1 the indifference schedule
































































  In many countries the statutory tax rates on capital gains are lower than the tax rates on cash
15
distributions.  In Australia, for example, only real capital gains are taxed.
10
Figure 3:  Capital Market Equilibrium
Taking all consumers and firms together in equilibrium we therefore have:
This is illustrated in figure 3
where the budget constraints
and indifference schedules have
been aggregated across all firms
and consumers who face the
same security payouts and
security prices.  The Asset
Production Frontier (RR)
measures the aggregate payouts
to debt and equity by all firms,
while UU is the aggregate
indifference schedule for all
consumers.  The linearity of
these schedules follows from the
fact that the underlying net
outputs are fixed by given
investment.
It is clear from Figure 3 that leverage irrelevance holds at both the aggregate level and for
individual firms in the absence of taxation.  Any debt-equity choices along the asset production
frontier RR are a matter of indifference for all consumers because they are willing to hold
either type of security in equilibrium.
4. Miller’s Equilibrium
Miller examines the way personal taxes offset the classical corporate tax bias against equity. 
The corporate tax exempts interest on corporate bonds and is assumed to be a constant rate 
for all firms.  In contrast, personal taxes apply to all income received by investors, but at
different rates to capture the progressive rate scales that typically apply to personal income
with taxes on cash distributions (as interest and dividends),  , being greater than the taxes on
capital gains,  , for all consumers.
15
4.1  Equilibrium with Just a Classical Corporate Tax
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  We follow the familiar practice of assuming tax revenue is not returned to the economy.  While this
16
matters for the equilibrium prices and consumption it does not change the way the taxes affect the slopes of
consumer indifference schedules and the asset production frontier in the debt-equity space.  Our interest here is
not in the welfare effects of the taxes, but the way they distort relative prices.
  In practice the taxes are levied on measured (or accounting) income which differs from economic
17
income.  A major reason for the difference lies in the way depreciation is measured.
    The net output of each firm j measures its residual value at t=1.  In a multi-period model there
18
would also be the value of the firm at t=1.  This would allow us to measure depreciation in the conventional
way by calculating the change in the value of the firm over each period of time.
11
own.   It is assumed throughout the analysis that taxes apply to economic income i.e., there is
16
no tax on capital, but since capital is returned to consumers with income in the second period,
the two components need to be separated by writing market payouts as  .  
17
These are payouts after corporate tax has been paid by firms, and are what consumers receive. 




Notice how interest income and the initial capital invested in debt and equity are tax deductible
expenses under the classical corporate tax base; only income paid on equity is subject to tax. 
This is more easily recognised by rewriting the constraint as:
.
The first order conditions for the representative consumer and firm in the presence of the
corporate tax, are:
Security Consumer i Firm j
This leads to:
 - for consumers; and,
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  The constraints could bound these trades from below where this allows the equilibrium to move
19
down along RR beyond point B.  This would make consumers better off by the additional wealth they obtain
from tax arbitrage.
  Consumers cannot satisfy their risk preferences with a full set of conventional bonds if the selling
20
constraints on them are binding in equilibrium.  Recall that the bond market is complete for consumers when
they have access to a full set of linearly independent conventional bonds, and face no constraints on their
security trades.
12
Figure 4: Equilibrium with just Corporate Taxation
Firms issue both debt and equity when   in each state s (with  =1), while
consumers hold both securities when   in each state s (with  ).  Clearly, these
conditions cannot hold simultaneously because  .  Instead, consumers prefer
debt over equity because it exempts corporate income from tax.
This is illustrated in Figure 4 where
the slope of the asset production
frontier RR is less (in absolute value
terms) than the slope of the
aggregate indifference curve UU. 
The tax reduces corporate income
payable to consumers when firms sell
equity; where this shifts the intercept
of RR from A to A1.  Since no tax is
collected on debt, the intercept at B
is unchanged.  No equilibrium exists
in this setting unless tax arbitrage is
restricted, and this can be achieved
by restricting security sales by
consumers, or restricting security
purchases by firms.  If either of these
constraints is prohibitive, an all debt
equilibrium exists at point B in the diagram, where no equity is issued by firms or consumers,
and no corporate tax revenue is collected.
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At this point it is worth noting that the choice between the constraints to restrict tax arbitrage
can cause subtle differences in the analysis.  If firms face buying constraints, consumers can
spread risk with a full set of conventional bonds; in essence, they can create a full set of
primitive securities.  Alternatively, if consumers face selling constraints, they cannot create a
full set of primitive securities with a full set of conventional bonds.   Instead, they rely on
20
firms to supply the risky bonds that satisfy their risk preferences, and firms can do this with a
full set of conventional securities; in a frictionless common information setting where firms
know the risk preferences of consumers, and face incentives to satisfy them in a tax effective
manner when the market is competitive.  These insights will be useful when personal taxes are



































































  All equity income is paid as a capital gain in this model because dividends are subject to a higher
21
rate of personal tax than are capital gains for all consumers.
  Interest dominates dividends, despite being subject to the same personal tax rate, because dividends
22
are also subject to corporate tax.  Even though capital gains are double taxed, they can dominate interest for
consumers with personal cash tax rates that exceed the corporate tax rate.
13
4.2  Equilibrium with Corporate and Personal Taxes




The only returns to equity are capital gains; no dividends are paid because the personal taxes
on them are higher for all consumers.   The first order conditions for the representative
22
consumer and firm are summarised in the following table.
Security Consumer i Firm j
Firms supply both securities when   in each state s, while consumers buy both
securities when   in each state s.  These conditions are met
simultaneously when:
Any consumers with personal taxes that satisfy this relationship are marginal investors.  Notice
how payouts to equity are double taxed under the corporate tax system.
When personal tax rates differ across consumers, we can have:
(i)    - for equity specialists;
(ii)    - for debt specialists; and,
(iii)    - for marginal investors.
To simplify the analysis let us assume all equity specialists have the same tax rates as do all
debt specialists.  This gives consumers in each tax clientele illustrated in Figure 5 the same
sloped indifference schedules.  Once again, they are linear because debt and equity are equally
risky at the margin.  The different slopes reflect the different personal tax rates, where those
with schedules   have a tax preference for equity, those with schedules   have a tax





































  In this model the marginal personal tax rates are endowed exogenously on consumers so tax
23
preferences are unaffected by changes in wealth from tax arbitrage.  Dammon and Green (1987) provide a
diagrammatic analysis of the equilibrium outcomes when marginal personal tax rates are increasing functions
of income, while Jones and Milne (1992) include a government budget constraint to bound the equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Tax Preferences for Individual Consumers
Figure 6:  Miller’s Equilibrium
It is clear from figure 5 that the debt
and equity specialists have infinite
demands for their tax preferred
securities unless they are constrained
from selling debt and equity; debt
specialists increase their wealth by
going short in equity and long in debt,
while equity specialists increase their
wealth by taking the opposite
positions.  Unless this tax arbitrage is
constrained no equilibrium exists.   If
23
consumers are completely constrained
from selling securities, equity
specialists locate at point A, debt
specialist at point B, and marginal investors anywhere along their budget constraints between
the points A and B.
Miller’s equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 6 where consumers divide into
strict tax clienteles.  Point A is the
minimum amount of debt that must be
supplied to satisfy debt specialists,
while point B is the minimum amount
of equity that must be supplied to
satisfy equity specialists.  The
allocations between points A and B
are those which marginal investors are
willing to hold.  The aggregate
supplies of debt and equity in
equilibrium must therefore lie along
the line segment AB on the asset
production frontier RR.
It is easy to see how consumers specialise in one security when there is no risk to spread. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980b) obtain the same result in an uncertainty setting when there is a
complete set of primitive bonds and a complete set of primitive shares; consumers can spread
risk by just holding their tax-preferred securities.  Notice how the aggregate debt-equity ratio
is indeterminate along the line segment AB in Figure 6.  There are two ways of demonstrating
Miller’s leverage irrelevance proposition for individual firms.  The first relies on the arbitrage
activity by investors, while the second relies on the arbitrage activity by firms.  If one firm
changes its capital structure and moves the aggregate debt-equity ratio along the line segment












  This is demonstrated by Auerbach and King when consumers have mean variance preferences.
24
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Figure 7: MM without Marginal Investors
But marginal investors are not required for this irrelevance result.
To see this, consider Miller’s
equilibrium in Figure 7 without them,
where there is an optimal aggregate
debt-equity ratio at point A.  When
one firm raises its leverage and moves
the equilibrium below A along RR,
there is an excess supply of debt and
excess demand for equity.  This puts
downward pressure on the price of
debt and upward pressure on the price
of equity which induces other firms to
shift out of debt and into equity (with
the same risk).  Thus, the aggregate
debt-equity ratio stays constant, and
there is no change in the real
consumption opportunities for consumers.  Geometrically, it is the linearity in the indifference
schedules and/or linearity in the aggregate production frontier that drives Miller’s irrelevance
proposition.
Finally, if the primitive securities in DeAngelo and Masulis are replaced with conventional
securities (that have payouts in more than one state), consumers will have to rely on firms to
supply the risky securities that satisfy their tax preferences.  If firms cannot supply these
securities (because, for example, the capital market is incomplete) consumers may bundle debt
and equity together to spread risk, even though they have a tax preference for one of the
securities.  This generates the “investor leverage clienteles” identified by Kim et al., Taggart,
Kim and Auerbach and King.  Once investors break out of strict tax clienteles, firm debt-
equity choices can change their real consumption opportunities by altering the riskiness of
their tax-preferred securities; Miller’s leverage irrelevance result fails.
24
Sarig and Scott argue these investor leverage clienteles disappear in a competitive capital
market.  The previous analysis demonstrates the role played by firms (or their agents) in the
spanning arguments used by Sarig and Scott.  In a frictionless common information setting,
firms will costlessly create the tax-preferred securities that satisfy the risk preferences of every
investor.  This separates investors into strict tax clienteles, and Miller’s leverage irrelevance
holds because firms preserve the aggregate supplies of debt and equity instruments that
investors prefer.
5. Conclusion
This paper highlights the arbitrage activity by firms in Miller’s equilibrium.  Arbitrage is crucial
to all the MM irrelevance propositions, and can be undertaken by consumers and/or firms. 
Once consumers face (short) selling constraints to restrict tax arbitrage, competition is16
preserved in Miller’s equilibrium if firms can arbitrage away any profits.  And this is the
invisible hand that drives firms to supply investors with the securities that satisfy their risk and
tax preferences.  If firms are also constrained, investor leverage clienteles arise, and Miller’s
leverage irrelevance result fails to apply.  
There are good practical reasons to expect that firms do not costlessly obtain information
about their investor’s risk preferences, nor is it costless for them to create these securities.  It
is quite likely that, once these costs are made explicit in the formal analysis, investor leverage
clienteles will arise.  But clearly, this takes the analysis outside the “classical finance” model
that underpins the MM irrelevance propositions.References:
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